Fordham Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 1

Article 6

1963

Book Reviews

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 207 (1963).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol32/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

BOOKS REVIEWED
Law, Liberty and Morality. By H. L. A. Hart. Stanford: Stanford University
Press. 1963. Pp. 88. $3.00.
Law, Liberty and Morality is an essay by H. L. A. Hart that originated as the
1962 Harry Camp Lectures presented at Stanford University.
A Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, the author discusses the
relationship between law and morals. He formulates the discussion around certain
questions: Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards immoral sufficient
to justify making that conduct punishable by law? Is it morally permissible to enforce morality as such? Ought immorality as such to be a crime?
The inspiration for the discussion is obviously the Wolfenden Report,1 which
was presented to the British Parliament in September, 1957 by a committee drawn
from the clergy and from the fields of medicine, sociology, psychiatry and law, the
chairman of which was Sir John Wolfenden, C. B. E. The Wolfenden Committee had
been charged with considering the state of criminal law relating to both prostitution
and homosexuality. Written in nontechnical language, the report is an important
work of general interest, and of particular interest to those concerned with a sound
philosophy of the criminal law. Interest in the report has been renewed by the
Profumo scandal.
As to homosexuality, the Committee recommended that homosexual practices
between consenting adults in private should no longer be a crime-ts- to prostitution
they recommended that, though it should not itself be made illegal, legislation should
be passed to drive it off the streets on the ground that public soliciting was an
offensive nuisance to ordinary citizens. 3 The principles underlying these recommendations are set forth in Section 13 of the Committee's Report as follows:
[The] function [of the criminal law], as we see it, is to preserve public order and
decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide
sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly those
who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, [or]

inexperienced.

....

4

Professor Hart says that these principles "are strikingly similar to those expounded by Mill in his essay 'On Liberty' ,5 one hundred years ago.0 He refers
in particular to Mill's observation that "the only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is
7
to prevent harm to others."
Mill's position has twice been sharply challenged-the first time by Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen, the great Victorian judge and historian of the common law; 8
1. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (Authorized
American ed. 1963).
2. Id. at 48.
3. Id. at 155-57.
4. Id. at 23.
5.

Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 14 (1963).

6.
7.
8.

Mill, On Liberty (1859).
Hart, op. cit. supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Mills, On Liberty ch. I).
Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (2d ed. 1874).
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the second by Lord Devlin, a member of the present House of Lords, in his essay
The Enforcement of Morals.9 Both argued that the use of the criminal law to
enforce morality was justified.
A considerable portion of the essay deals with Mill and criticisms of his philosophy. After examining their arguments in detail the author demonstrates that the
critics fail to recognize distinctions of vital importance for legal political theory, and
that they espouse a conception of the function of legal punishment that few would
now share.
Professor Hart's assumption that the principles underlying the recommendation
of the Wolfenden Report are' based on Mill's essay is, however, not supported
by any evidence. They are more likely derived from the Thomistic philosophical
concepts that the function of criminal law is limited, that primarily human law
should implement the moral law only where violations thereof affect the common
good, and that sanctity will always remain an individual affair.' 0 At the request
of the committee, seven Catholic clergymen and laymen appointed by the late
Bernard Cardinal Griffin, Archbishop of Westminister, submitted a report" which
advised, among other things:
It is not the business of the State to intervene in the purely private sphere but
to act solely as the defender of the common good. Morally evil things so far as
they do not affect the common good are not the concern of the human legislator....
Sin as such is not the concern of the State but affects the relations between the
soul and God. . . . Attempts by the State to enlarge its authority and invade the
individual conscience, however high-minded, always fail and frequently do positive

harm ....

12

Whatever the origin of the Wolfenden principles, it is the failure to apply them,
not only in legislating as to sex deviation but to antisocial conduct generally, that
is the great weakness of the criminal law in the United States.
JOHN M.

MURTAG11*

Freedom of Speech and Press in America. By Edward G. Hudon. Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1963. Pp. xiv, 224. $4.50.
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." These simple words of the first amendment to the Constitution, as was
suggested by Benjamin N. Cardozo many years ago with respect to the great generalities of the Constitution, "'have a content and a significance that vary from age to
age.'" In this unusually scholarly volume on the evolution of the first amendment
doctrine in the United States Supreme Court, Dr. Edward G. Hudon, assistant
9. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1959).
10. 2 Farrel, Companion to the Summa 393-411 (1939).
11. Homosexuality, Prostitution and the Law: The Report of the Roman Catholic Advisory Committee, 230 Dublin R. 57 (1956).
12. Id. at 61.

* Administrative Judge, Criminal Court of the City of New York.
1. Hudon, Freedom of Speech and Press in America 167 (1963), quoting Cardozo,
The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (1921).

1963]

BOOKS REVIEWED

librarian of that Court, traces the variance in the meaning of those prohibitions
over the years.
The rights of freedom of speech and press have acquired a greatly enhanced
importance in American life today because of the temper of the times and the
expanded media of communication-and because of the application of the first
amendment prohibitions to the states through the instrumentality of the fourteenth
amendment.2 With the increase in importance of the rights, the need for basic
standards by which to measure their scope has become urgent. There has been
considerable judicial vacillation, owing in no small measure "to the lack of a basic
philosophy to serve as a stabilizing influence"a in the Court's interpretations.
After the commotion engendered by the Alien and Sedition Acts of 17984 had
subsided,5 the application of the first amendment prohibitions lay quiescent for many
decades, until the twentieth century-in particular, until the extension of the prohibitions to the states by the Supreme Court in 1925. 6 In this century, the quest for
the true meaning of the rights, in an ever-increasing number of cases, has found an
answer first in one theory and then in another.
In the World War I Espionage Act cases7 and the State Criminal Syndicalism
Act cases,8 the theory of "use-abuse" or "liberty versus license" was devised, invoking a distinction between freedom of speech and press that was considered
"right" and freedom of speech and press that was considered "wrong." The inflexibility of this theory and its quite severe restraint on speech and press contributed to
its being supplanted by a less rigid standard-the "clear and present danger"
doctrine which was originated by Holmes and Brandeis in minority o and concurring 0
opinions even while "use-abuse" was still being applied. But this doctrine was held in
abeyance during the 1930's while Charles Evans Hughes was Chief Justice, and the
Old English concept of "previous restraint" was resorted to," as it is even today
2
when no other theory is deemed appropriate.'
During the 1940's "clear and present danger" predominated in an atmosphere
2. E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
3. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at 172.
4. Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570;
Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
5. There is no specific point in time when the furor died down. The Sedition
Act expired March 3, 1801. See Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. V.
6. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921);
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466
(1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 US. 204 (1919).; Schenck v. United States,

249 U.S. 47 (1919); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
8. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).

9.
10.
11.
12.

Gitlow v. New York, supra note 8, at 672.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Smith v. California, 361 US. 147 (1959).
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which accorded civil rights a "preferred position."' 3 It was extended to cases involving
picketing,' 4 the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses, 15 contempt of court,'( and even
provocative speeches under circumstances bespeaking disorder and animosity. 17
Throughout, Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed his objection to the application of
C'a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken from its context,' "1S which
he believed Holmes never intended to be " 'a technical legal doctrine or to convey a
formula for adjudicating cases.' "19 The doctrine of "clear and present danger" had
served satisfactorily in cases where the accused had acted generally in good faith;
but in the 1950's, the communist conspiracy cases involving designs upon the national
security demonstrated its inadequacy. The Court-or, at any rate, five of nine
Justices 2 O-turned to the theory of "balancing of interests" despite serious objections
by the dissenting members. 21 The present trend seems to be away from "balancing"
in favor of "toning down" first amendment issues and treating them as questions of
22
evidence.
Dr. Hudon believes that the lack of a basic philosophy regarding the first amendment has not been caused by "'insufficient data by which to determine the interests
entitled to protection under it.' ",23 He believes that adopting the technique of recourse
to the legislative history, used so extensively today in construing statutes to determine
the "intent" of Congress, would reveal the natural-law environment in which the
Constitution and the first amendment found expression, and provide a basis for a
stabilized interpretation. This would not entail an adherence to the natural law on
the part of the Court any more than it now requires the Court to support the
arguments upon which the Congress has been persuaded to enact a particular law.
Those arguments simply explain what the Congress intended by its enactmentwhich binds the Court as well as the parties.
The first amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, was intended to make the
Constitution itself more acceptable by spelling out the "inalienable rights" referred
to in the Declaration of Independence and generally considered "natural." The
Founding Fathers' belief in the doctrine of natural rights, a secularized version
of natural law, explains the intent of the first amendment and supplies a norm for
its interpretation. The rejection by the Court of the data available to show the
13. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
14 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
15. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941),; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).

16. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
17. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
18. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at 108, quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946)
19. Ibid.

(concurring opinion).

20. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart.
21. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959).

22. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
23. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at 172, quoting Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 167, 171 (1961).
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"harmonizing sentiments of the day"2 4 that existed when the amendment was adopted
is the pre-eminent cause of the failure to achieve an enduring norm.
In his introduction, Morris L. Ernst deprecates Dr. Hudon's belief in natural law,
stating that "for a nonworshiper like me, this approach seems to be nothing but a
bit of metaphysics," 25 but he frankly acknowledges that the volume, which he
describes as being in the tradition of Zechariah Chafee, caused him to debate with
himself his own attitudes.
The volume, described by Mr. Justice Douglas as "in many respects the best
analysis in English of the anatomy of our First Amendment rights," 20 is sufficiently
documented to satisfy the lawyer and scholar, yet not so technical as to discourage

the layman.
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, "It is good that this book is available."L
CHARLES J. ZI.NN*

The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State. By James E. Anderson.
Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 172. $4.50.
This history deals with the years 1887 through 1917, the period which saw the
birth and first maturity of our national regulatory state. The purpose of the work,
as stated in the preface, is "to examine the various ideas on regulation expressed
during this era, the major patterns of thought existent, and the objectives of actual
or proposed regulation," with a view to "a better understanding of economic regulation and its ideological environment, both during the era studied and the years
since."' The sources employed are the Congressional Record, congressional hearings
and committee reports, Supreme Court cases, reports of independent regulatory
commissions, speeches and writings of government officials, books and articles by
scholars and popular writers, and publications of business associations. From these
the author has compiled a catalogue of ideas concerning, and the objectives of,
economic regulation current during the period under discussion. This perhaps serves
to give one the flavor of the matter, as a survey of English literature might do for
that subject, without, unfortunately, affording any great understanding. A survey
can cover a lot of ground, of course, but this is done at the expense of depth.
Dr. Anderson's book is a survey, listing under appropriate headings a great many
ideas concerning economic regulation. These ideas are stated summarily: A senator said this in a speech; an industrialist that; President Wilson something else.
But a list is, after all, only a list. It requires a critical analysis of ideas and their
implications to afford understanding. Thus, a short work can tell us a great deal about
the modem state because, rather than merely cataloguing details, it looks for mean24. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at x, quoting the Writings of Thomas Jefferson 118, 119
(memorial edition 1904).
25. Hudon, op. cit. supra note 1, at viii.
26. Id. at v.
27. Ibid.
* Member of Washington, D.C. Bar; Law Revision Counsel to United States House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary.
1. Anderson, Preface to The Emergence of the Modem Regulatory State at ix (1962).
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ing.2 Unfortunately, Dr. Anderson did not choose to analyze the thoughts he presented. Consequently the value of his book is limited. It does not give us the better
understanding of the regulatory state that was intended.
EARNEST EARL PHILLIPS*
2. Hoffman, The Spirit of Politics and the Future of Freedom (1950).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.

